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1 Introduction 
 
Responsibility for negligence is something of a puzzle.  In everyday life as 
well as in the law, we regularly assume that people are responsible for their 
negligent conduct.  Yet, justifying this assumption has proven challenging.  
We tend to think of responsibility in relation to conduct that is willful, self-
guided, controlled, and knowingly performed – intentional action being the 
paradigm.  What makes explaining responsibility for negligent conduct 
difficult is negligence’s unwittingness.  Negligent conduct is never intentional 
and is either not self-guided or is performed unknowingly and without 
awareness of its negligence.  When acting negligently it is not entirely clear, 
therefore, how one’s agency controls or is even involved in one’s conduct.  In 
fact, negligent conduct can appear to take place regardless and at times even 
in spite of one’s agency, which has led many to doubt the justification of legal 
as well as the very notion of (moral) responsibility for negligence.  
 The paper aims to make two central contributions.  First, offering a 
conception of negligence explaining the often-overlooked role of competency 
in negligence (Section 7).  Second, offering an answer to the puzzle of 
responsibility for negligent conduct (Sections 9 & 10).  In a nutshell, 
responsibility for an instance of negligent conduct turns on ‘quality of agency’                                                         
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or, more specifically, on the quality of one’s agency as an individual (as 
opposed to as a generic person) at performing that type of conduct to one’s 
competency.  This conclusion is arrived at through reflecting on the 
aforementioned conception of negligence and on the largely ignored fact that 
occasional accidents are an unavoidable fact of life and a feature of the inherent 
fallibility of human agency.          
 To clarify, in discussing “responsibility” my concern is with what is 
sometimes referred to as “moral responsibility” or “personal responsibility.”  
Such responsibility may attach to conduct as well as to the outcomes of 
conduct, yet my focus here is only on responsibility for the former.  Note that 
the paper discusses negligence as a general normative concept, not the specific 
case of legal negligence; although grounding moral responsibility for 
negligence certainly has implications for the moral grounds of its legal 
counterpart.  In the paper, “negligent conduct” and “negligence” are used 
interchangeably as are “conduct” and “behavior.”  When labeling someone 
“negligent”, the paper refers to a person as behaving negligently.  “Conduct” 
and “behavior” are used to refer to actions and omissions alike.  Finally, the 
paper refers to certain conduct as “unwitting” or “inadvertent,” by which I 
mean conduct performed unintentionally and/or unknowingly.        
 
2 Personal Responsibility for Conduct 
 
A person’s responsibility for conduct turns on a type of connection between 
one’s conduct and one’s practical agency. 1   Several features comprise 
practical agency.  H.L.A. Hart, for instance, puts matters in terms of                                                         
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“responsibility capacities.” 2   Broadly, practical agents possess certain 
cognitive, rational, and epistemic capacities, such as the capacity to understand, 
detect, and remember norms, reasons and facts, and the capacity to reason, feel, 
deliberate, and to make judgments regarding norms, reasons, and facts.  Agents 
also possess practical capacities, including the capacity to choose, make 
decisions, and control their bodies.  Possessing this bundle of capacities 
constitutes one as a subject able to respond (i.e., response-able) to reasons 
through action (and omission), transcending compulsion, instinct, and passion.  
That is, a rational subject who, to an extent, determines her own conduct based 
on her own volition and reasoning.  Accordingly, it is possessing practical 
agency that makes one into the sort of being who can be responsible for what 
one does. 
 Yet mere capacity for responsibility is not sufficient to ground 
responsibility. To be responsible for one’s conduct, one’s capacities for 
responsibility (i.e., one’s practical agency) must be somehow connected, 
engaged, expressed, manifested, or involved with one’s conduct.  It is by virtue 
of such a connection between one’s agency and one’s conduct that one is 
responsible for said conduct.  
 
3 Volitionism and Responsibility for Intentional Conduct 
 
The contrast with the case of responsibility for intentional conduct helps 
illuminate the difficulty in accounting for responsibility for negligence.  With 
origins stemming back to Aristotle, the classic conception of responsibility for 
conduct is that it involves knowledge, willfulness, awareness, and control of 
one’s conduct.3  The basic idea is that A’s responsibility for phi-ing depends 
on one having phi-ed voluntarily and knowingly; a conception of responsibility 
aptly labeled by some “volitionist”.4  The paradigm for this conception of 
responsibility is the intentional action (or omission), wherein the 
responsibility-establishing connection between conduct and agency is obvious.                                                          
2 HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 1968) at 
154-55, 227-30.  A view further developed and extrapolated on by, for example, 
Tadros, supra note 1 at 227-51 and Joseph Raz, From Normativity to 
Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2011) at 55-57, 138.  
3  Antony Duff, “Legal and Moral Responsibility” (2009) 4:6 Philosophy 
Compass 978.   
4  Holly M Smith, “Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance” (2011) 5:2 Crim 
& Philosophy 115 at 121. 
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When acting intentionally, one’s capacities for responsibility are clearly 
engaged in carrying out the action for which one is responsible.  Intentional 
action is willed, initiated, controlled, guided and generally is knowingly and 
willfully performed by one’s agency.  There seems to be, therefore, at least no 
pre-theoretical mystery as to how intentional action is ascribable to one’s 
agency and therefore why we hold people responsible for their intentional 
actions and, correspondingly, why we identify them with, evaluate them, and 
credit or hold them liable for those actions.  The same seems true, mutatis 
mutandis, for intentional omissions.  In contrast, accounting for the 
responsibility-establishing connection between agency and negligent conduct 
is much less straightforward.     
 
4 Negligence as Improper Unwitting Conduct  
 
Before exploring the matter of responsibility for negligent conduct we need a 
conception of what comprises such conduct.  All negligence is unwitting, at 
least if we take the term “negligence” to stand for a normative category distinct 
from related categories such as intentional, known, or reckless conduct.  Notice 
that the term “negligence” is deployed in various and at times inconsistent 
ways, be it in natural language, philosophy, or the law.  For instance, in the 
legal context, one may be liable for the tort of negligence in relation to one’s 
accidental, reckless or even intentional wrongdoing.  Similarly, it seems 
perfectly natural to describe people who simultaneously text and drive as 
“behaving negligently” even though they are fully cognizant of the nature and 
risks of their conduct.  Such uses of the term “negligence” in law and in natural 
language clearly do not translate into the normative category of accidental, 
unwitting, and inadvertent conduct with which I am concerned here. 
 There are at least three categories of negligence.  One involves unwittingly 
omitting from doing something that one would have done intentionally were 
one more aware, accurate, careful, attentive etc.  Examples of such unwitting 
behavior include leaving one’s small child in the car, neglecting calling a 
friend on her birthday, failing to stop at a red light while driving, or forgetting 
to record the ‘big game.’  A second type of negligence involves intentionally 
trying to do one thing only to inadvertently end up doing something else, such 
as intending to pick up a glass yet dropping it on the floor, intending to step on 
the brake pedal only to accidentally step on the gas pedal instead, or attempting 
to give exact change yet confusing the coins’ denominations.  And then there 
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are cases of unwittingly failing to do that which one should have done.5 
 Yet negligence is more than mere accident – negligence also has a 
normative component.  Negligence is conduct that is in some sense improper.  
It is conduct in violation of some standard.  The standard may be internal – as 
just explained, often when negligent we do something accidentally that we 
would not have done had we been aware or more fully in control of our conduct.  
Here what makes the accident negligent is the failure to live up to one’s own 
standards residing in one’s intentions or background aspirations, commitments, 
and values.  This type of unwitting conduct may count as negligent because it 
is conduct in conflict with one’s own will and agency – giving reason for self-
directed critical reactions, such as blame, disappointment, or annoyance with 
oneself.  For example, I am negligent if I intend to pick up a glass yet it 
unwittingly slips from my grasp and shatters on the floor.  Or when unwittingly 
running a red light one might thereby act against one’s background 
commitment to obey law, the value that one puts on one’s own safety and on 
the safety of others, or one’s aspirations of being a good driver. 
 Negligence may also turn on violating an external standard.  For instance, 
the philosophical literature on negligence is almost entirely devoted to conduct 
that is negligent by virtue of violating a moral imperative.  External normative 
standards also come in other forms – standards of civility, professional codes 
of conduct, rules of games, aesthetic standards, social norms, norms of 
association and friendship etc.  And the legal tort of negligence is all about the 
violation of judicially determined objective legal standards of conduct.  
Unwitting violations of all such standards might also qualify as negligent in 
their respective normative realms.  
 What is the relation between negligent conduct predicated on violations of 
these two different types of standards – internal and external?  First, as some 
of the examples above suggest, negligence that is purely self-regarding is not 
only possible but also pervasive – occasionally we unwittingly let ourselves 
down, regardless of whether we thereby also violate some external standard.  
Second, negligence often involves a violation of both an external and an 
internal standard – frequently our standards for ourselves correspond and adopt 
the external standards that bind us.   
 Finally, can unwitting conduct in violation of an external standard but not 
of an internal standard count as negligent?  That is, can we act negligently 
when unwittingly doing something that is somehow objectively wrongful that                                                         
5 This third category often – although not necessarily – overlaps with one of the 
previous two.   
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we would have, nevertheless, done intentionally had we been acting wittingly?  
I think so, as such cases still involve accidental conduct that is normatively 
problematic vis-à-vis the negligent actor.  For example, under normal 
conditions accidentally running over a person with one’s car is negligent, even 
if unbeknownst to the driver the victim turns out to be the driver’s nemesis.  
And such accidental conduct remains negligent even if, had the driver been 
paying attention to the road, he or she would have acted no differently – this 
time intentionally keeping the car on a collision course with her nemesis.  
Accordingly, I take the normativity of negligence as either self-regarding, 
external, or both.  
   
5 The Puzzle of Responsibility in Negligence 
 
Recall the assumption that we set out to explain – conducting oneself 
negligently entails one’s responsibility for said conduct.  Yet the 
responsibility-establishing connection between agency and conduct is far less 
obvious in the case of negligence than it is in the case of intentional conduct.  
How is one ever responsible for phi-ing if one did not intend to phi, did not 
want to phi, was unaware that one was phi-ing or one’s phi-ing was not under 
the guidance of one’s agency?  In such cases there seems, at least on the face 
of things, no responsibility-establishing connection between one’s practical 
agency and one’s conduct – there appears to be no obvious way in which one’s 
agency is involved, expressed, manifested, or engaged in performing one’s 
negligence.  On the contrary, when negligent our agency appears disengaged 
from our (accidental) conduct rather than involved in carrying it out.  Moreover, 
we saw that when negligent we often act against our will in the sense that we 
do that which we would not have done intentionally had we been aware or in 
better control of our conduct.  Accordingly, negligence can seem something 
that happens to us disjointedly from our agency or even in spite of it, rather 
than something that we do as agents.  
 This is why the notion that responsibility is somehow inherent to 
negligence is puzzling.6  On the one hand, we regularly ascribe responsibility 
and, relatedly, also attribute liability, hold accountable, as well as make critical 
evaluations of people based on their negligent conduct.  Moreover, when                                                         
6 For more on the puzzle of responsibility in negligence, see Ori J Herstein, 
“Responsibility in Negligence: Why the Duty of Care is Not a Duty 'To Try'” 
(2010) 23:2 Can JL & Jur 403; Michael J Zimmerman, “Moral Responsibility 
and Ignorance” (1997) 107:3 Ethics 410. 
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acting negligently we view ourselves as negligent.  We do not think that our 
negligence is something that happens to us; rather, we ‘own’ our negligence, 
associating ourselves with it as responsible agents.  Yet, on the other hand, it 
is unclear what justifies these pervasive ascriptions of responsibility and 
related ascriptions of ownership, liability, and critical evaluations.  In fact, the 
difficulty in accounting for the basis of responsibility for negligent behavior 
has led many in the literature to doubt and even to reject that such 
responsibility obtains at all.7 
 
 6  Could Have Done Otherwise   
 
 We think of negligent conduct as conditioned on capacity – conduct is not 
negligent without the capacity to do otherwise.  Here capacity is divisible into 
two types.  First, there are conditions independent of the agent, that is, capacity 
to phi requires opportunity to phi.  Second, there are conditions regarding the 
agent herself, mainly possessing the ability to phi.  For example, a 
misdiagnosis is not negligent if the physician lacked the requisite training to 
spot the telling symptoms or if no such symptoms were manifest, making 
diagnosis impossible.  In both cases, although the physician unwittingly 
misdiagnosed the patient, the physician did not do so negligently due to the 
lack of ability or opportunity to make the right diagnosis.        
 Accordingly, although when negligent we do not act intentionally and 
often not even knowingly, it may seem that that does not make our negligence 
any less ours.   After all, when negligent we – as responsible agents – should 
have and could have done otherwise, which seemingly makes us responsible 
                                                        
7  Jules L Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge University Press, 1992) at 
217-20; Tony Honoré, “The Morality of Tort Law – Questions and Answers” in 
DG Owen, ed, Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Clarendon Press, 1995) 
73; Gideon Rosen, “Culpability and Ignorance” (2003) 103 Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 61; Claire O Finkelstein, “Responsibility for Unintended 
Consequences” (2005) 2 Ohio State Crim LJ 578; Larry Alexander & Kimberly 
Ferzan, “Against Negligence Liability” in P Robinson & K Ferzan, eds, Criminal 
Law Conversations (Oxford University Press, 2009) 273-80; Matt King, “The 
Problem with Negligence” (2009) 35 Soc. Theory and Practice 577; Heidi M 
Hurd, “Finding No Fault with Negligence” in John Oberdiek, ed, Philosophical 
Foundations of the Law of Torts (Oxford University Press, 2014) 387.  
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for not doing so.  In broad strokes this is the response Hart and others give to 
the puzzle of responsibility in negligence.8 
 But does not the initial puzzle persist?  Why is capacity to do otherwise – 
even when assuming that one should have done otherwise – sufficient to 
establish responsibility for failing to do so?  After all, considering that 
negligence is a type of unwitting conduct it seems that agency is disengaged 
from it.  Moreover, remember that some negligence involves acting in spite of 
one’s agency.  Accordingly, at least on the face of things, one’s agency does 
not appear manifested, expressed, involved, or engaged in carrying out one’s 
negligent conduct.  On the contrary, when we do something unwittingly or 
accidentally our agency seems almost absent from our behavior.  The fact that 
one could have done otherwise but unwittingly did not do so does not seem to 
entail that one’s agency was engaged in one’s conduct – it is not as if one’s 
agency actively brought about its own unwittingness.  An agent’s capacity to 
do otherwise than phi-ing is possibly a necessary condition of her 
responsibility for her phi-ing but, in any case, does not seem sufficient (at least 
if we accept that responsibility for conduct is predicated on one’s agency’s 
involvement, engagement, expression, or manifestation in the conduct).  It 
appears, therefore, that even accepting ‘capacity to do otherwise’ as a feature 
of negligence, something more is still needed to establish that negligence 
involves a responsibility-establishing connection between one’s agency and 
one’s conduct. 
 The question remains, therefore, whether and if so how does negligence 
involve agency in a way that establishes responsibility for such conduct?  Is 
negligence a type of conduct that one performs as a practical agent?  I think 
it is.  It is not as if Hart et al are not onto something.  What we need to figure 
out is what exactly – beyond capacity to do otherwise – accounts for the 
responsibility-establishing connection between one’s agency and one’s 
unwitting negligent conduct.    
                                                         
8 Hart, supra note 2 at 147-52; AJ Ayer, Philosophical Essays (Macmillan, 
1954) at 27; George Fletcher, “The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A 
Comparative Analysis” (1971) 119:3 U Pa L Rev 401; Anthony Duff, Answering 
for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart, 2007) at 71; 
John Gardner, “The Purity and Priority of Private Law” (1996) 46:3 UTLJ 459; 
John Gardner, “Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts” in Peter Cane & 
John Gardner, eds, Relating to Responsibility: Essays for Tony Honoré on His 
80th Birthday (Hart, 2001) 111.  
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7 Negligence and Competency  
 
An answer to the puzzle begins with realizing that negligence is not just about 
capacity to do otherwise, but is also predicated on a largely overlooked feature 
of negligence, which is competency to do otherwise.9  Competency for phi-ing 
is the ability to phi reliably and with relative confidence and ease. 10 
Competency incorporates the various actions (and omissions) that – barring a 
competency-defeating event (e.g., fainting, fatigue, illness) – one’s agency 
assumes and relies on as available to one.  Our competency normally includes 
numerous features, from the remarkable to the mundane – speaking a language, 
calculating costs and benefits, driving, walking, remembering, playing a 
musical instrument, dancing, conversing, and so on.   
 For example, I certainly have the capacity to make a layup in basketball 
so if I attempt to make such a shot and succeed I am thereby responsible for 
making the shot.11  Nevertheless, at this point in my life, I am alas no longer a 
competent lay-up shooter.  Accordingly, were I to attempt a handful of shots 
and inadvertently miss them all, for me missing would not be negligent.  I 
believe most people would agree that so long as I tried in earnest I am in the 
clear – my missing is unfortunate for my team and disappointing to me yet is 
not negligent.  Missing does not, for instance, make me vulnerable to criticism.  
In contrast, given their skill, for most professional basketball players such a 
sequence of misses is negligent – mere trying will not do.  What explains the 
intuitively clear difference between my case and the case of the professional is 
the fact that negligence involves not only failing to perform to one’s ability but 
also failing to perform to one’s competency.   
 Accordingly, negligence involves failing to meet a standard requiring 
conduct that is reliably, regularly, readily, and relatively easily, and 
confidently available to one.  Ability alone is not enough.  Negligence, 
therefore, is not only about what one had capacity to do and would have 
intentionally done and/or should have done, but is also about what one could 
have competently done.                                                         
9 Legal negligence is typically not conditioned on competency. See Vaughan v 
Menlove, [1837] 132 ER 490.    
10  Raz, supra note 2 at 243-51; Ori J Herstein, “Responsibility in Negligence: 
Discussion of From Normativity to Responsibility” (2013) 8:1 Jerusalem Rev 
Legal Studies 167. 
11 A “layup” is considered the easiest shot in the game of basketball.   
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 One’s competency for phi-ing is of course sensitive to one’s actual 
performance and success at phi-ing, but performance is not solely 
determinative of competency.  The fact is that one can succeed in doing what 
one is incompetent at as well as occasionally fail to perform to one’s 
competency.  The space between competency and actual performance is most 
salient when we fail to perform to our competency.  When professional 
basketball players uncharacteristically miss a layup, annoyance and 
disappointment, both personal and from others, is predicated on their failure to 
deliver on their competency.  Given their competency mere trying does not 
exculpate from negligence.  Accordingly, here missing does not entail reduced 
competency but rather a failure to perform to one’s competency.  Denying the 
gap between competency and actual performance – that is taking performance 
as fully determinative of competency – cannot make sense of the annoyance at 
and the disappointment with professional players and how that case differs 
from the case of the amateur.   
 Now obviously regularly failing to phi most likely entails one’s lack of 
competency for phi-ing.  For example, were a basketball player to continue 
uncharacteristically missing most layups, at some point we would say that his 
or her competency changed for the worse, and that the misses are simply 
reflective of his or her now diminished abilities rather than aberrations of the 
sort that justify, for example, surprise, disappointment, and criticism for 
missing.  Yet the fact that competency is subject to change does not entail that 
such change is entirely subservient to one’s performance in every specific case.  
There is a space allowing for exceeding and for failing to perform to one’s 
competency.  Negligence resides in that space.   
 
8 Negligence as Failure of Agency  
 
Intentional conduct involves responsibility for success while responsibility for 
negligence is responsibility for failing.  What do I mean by ‘success’?  
Responsibility for intentional conduct is responsibility for acting (or omitting) 
as one intended.  Here responsibility is a function of the agent’s intention to 
do what the agent in fact did.  Negligence is different.  When negligent one 
unwittingly fails to do that which one should have done, or what one intended 
to do or what one would have (intentionally) done.  The question of 
responsibly for negligence is how are we ever responsible for unwitting 
failure?   
 Negligence is not just any failure.  It is a failure of agency to meet its own 
competency as required by some standard.  Negligence is unwittingly not 
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doing what we should have and could have competently done, which suggests 
that when negligent something in our agency – that is in our responsibility 
capacities – goes awry.  Negligent conduct, therefore, involves an unwitting 
failing, misfire, or malfunction in agency, derailing oneself from performing 
to one’s own competency.12 
 Accordingly, it seems that the sought-after responsibility-establishing 
connection between one’s agency and one’s negligent conduct is that 
negligence is a form of conduct that expresses, involves, and manifests a 
failure of one’s agency.  Another way of putting this is that while we do not 
intend our agency’s failure – it is unwitting – our agency is nevertheless still 
present in our negligence which manifests, expresses, and generally involves 
our agency through the malfunction, misfiring, and failing of the responsibility 
capacities that our agency comprises.   
 The realization that negligent conduct involves agency failure may seem, 
therefore, to account for what is missing from the Hartian approach – the 
elusive responsibility-establishing relation between agency and negligent 
conduct.  Nevertheless, although certainly a crucial step forward, things are 
more complicated still.  Because, as argued below, not all instances of agency 
failures to meet one’s own competency to do otherwise in violation of a 
standard can underpin personal responsibility.          
 
9 ‘Nobody’s Perfect’: Quality of Agency and Responsibility for     
Negligence     
 
No one is perfect.  A measure of unwitting failures is part of life.  Even the 
best of us will, invariably, make inadvertent errors and have accidents.  It is 
unavoidable.  Unpacking what this fact entails for responsibility for unwitting 
conduct will pave the way towards understanding responsibility in negligence.      
 I will argue from a hypothetical.  Ed and Ned are both surgeons.  Ed is an 
outstanding surgeon who hardly ever errs, nearly always performing to his 
professional competency.  Like Ed, Ned is a competent surgeon of similar 
training and skill.  Thus, when performing to their competency their doctoring 
is equally good.  Only that Ned suffers from occasional inadvertent errors and 
slipups.  On a given day both Ed and Ned perform surgery and inadvertently 
perform identically badly.  For instance, each of them accidently neglects to 
extract a surgical clamp from his patient’s abdominal cavity or overestimates 
the required size of an incision.  The question is, does the responsibility of each                                                         
12 Raz, supra note 2 at 227-50. 
  
 12 
of them for his respective error differ from the other’s, considering the 
variations in their overall aptitude in performing to their competency?  And if 
so, why?   
 What if anything differentiates Ed’s case from Ned’s?  It is neither their 
competency nor the nature of their error – both are competent surgeons of 
similar training, skill, ability, knowledge, and experience.  And both make 
exactly the same errors.  Where Ed and Ned do differ is in the background 
quality of their agency when it comes to doctoring.  To clarify, by ‘quality of 
agency’ I do not refer to the pair’s competencies at doctoring – which are 
similar – but rather to how good they are at meeting their individual 
competency for doctoring – in which Ed and Ned differ dramatically.   
 To appreciate the crucial distinction between one’s competency and the 
quality of one’s agency at meeting one’s competency, and to understand the 
corresponding difference between Ed and Ned, recall my earlier distinction 
(Section 7) between competency and actual performance to one’s competency 
and how actual performance can – and does, due to the inevitably of agency 
failure – fall short of competency.  Here “quality of agency” refers to how able 
one is at closing the gap between one’s competency for phi-ing and one’s 
actual successes at phi-ing.        
 It is the difference in the quality of Ed and Ned’s respective agencies for 
meeting their respective competencies that explains the variance between their 
records.  Ed’s agency is like a Swiss clock, rarely missing a beat and almost 
always performing to its competency.  Ed’s record, therefore, is near perfect 
and at the forefront of his profession, while Ned’s record – due to occasional 
unwitting failures in agency – is less impressive.  In other words, although of 
similar competency, Ned’s responsibility capacities, unlike Ed’s, are prone to 
occasional malfunction and failure, which is why Ed almost always lives up to 
his competency while Ned occasionally does not.  When it comes to doctoring, 
the quality of Ed’s agency in terms of meeting his competency is far superior 
to Ned’s.   
 A key insight to draw from all this is that given the very high quality of 
Ed’s agency at meeting his competency when doctoring, his rare unwitting 
failures are less or even hardly at all his in the sense that establishes personal 
responsibility.  Here is why.  For a person possessing the pair’s high level of 
competency it is certainly possible to surpass Ned’s mediocre surgical record.  
In contrast, exceeding Ed’s rate of success is nearly impossible, which is 
indicative of the quality of Ed’s agency at meeting his competency for 
doctoring – it is near perfect.  In this respect, Ed’s agency is near to as good as 
any person could possibly be at meeting her competency.   
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 Now to err is human – a measure of failure is a fact of life.  Accordingly, 
given the very high quality of Ed’s agency at meeting his competency, his case 
of unwitting malpractice is much more an expected result of his fallibility as a 
generic human agent than it is a product of his shortcomings as an individual.   
In other words, given that his agency is nearly as good as any can be at meeting 
its competency, Ed’s rare unwitting failure is not so much an expression or 
manifestation of a failure of his agency as an individual as it is a feature of 
human agency as such.  No matter how impeccable, no one’s agency is perfect.  
A measure of imperfection, that is some measure of agency failure at living up 
to one’s competency, is inevitable.  It is because of this that Ed’s negligence 
is less an expression and manifestation of his practical agency as an individual 
person and more a feature of his generic human fallibility.  And remember the 
account of responsibility given at the outset: we are not responsible for conduct 
that is not carried out by nor involves, manifests, or expresses our agency; such 
conduct is not attributable to us as individual practical agents.  Thus, taking 
seriously the idea of personal responsibility along with the fact that ‘nobody’s 
perfect’, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that human imperfection impacts the 
measure of our responsibility and sets limits on it. 
 In our example, it is only to competent yet occasionally careless Ned that 
we can comfortably ascribe responsibility for unwitting errors during the 
operation.  Unlike nearly perfect Ed, whose quality of agency at doctoring 
represents the best anyone could hope to realistically achieve, Ned’s failure is 
due much more to a failure in his individual agency – he failed – than to the 
shortcomings inherent to his generic humanity.  This is not to say the Ned’s 
failure is not “his” in all senses.  Clearly Ned’s failed conduct is in some sense 
his.  Only it is not his in the sense that it does not arise out of his agency in the 
sort of way that establishes responsibility.     
 But what exactly does it mean for conduct to involve failure as a generic 
human agent as well as failure as an individual agent?  Only imperfect agents 
ever fail to meet their competency, which is why all unwitting failures to meet 
our competency to an extent reflect, involve, and manifest the innate fallibility 
of our agency.  Yet the fact that we never overcome the imperfections inherent 
to being human does not entail that our individual agency cannot do better or 
worse at meeting our competency.  Thus, the shortcomings of our agency 
reflected in our agency failures are a mix of generic human imperfection and 
of the degree to which our individual agency falls short of reaching its 
individual (imperfect) potential.  The measure of these ingredients in the ‘mix’ 
may fluctuate depending on the context and on the qualities of the individual 
agent.  Thus, the better one is at phi-ing to one’s competency, the less one’s 
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agency – as an individual – is involved, reflected, or manifested in one’s rare 
instance of unwittingly failing to competently phi.     
 Accordingly, explaining the responsibility-establishing relation between 
an agent and her negligent behavior in terms of the failure of agency inherent 
to negligent conduct is flawed.  What Ed’s example teaches us is that when an 
agent who reached the top of human capacity for phi-ing unwittingly fails at 
phi-ing, the agent is not responsible for unwitting malpractice.  If a failure in 
agency solely involves and only reflects one’s humanity and not at all one’s 
shortcomings as an individual, then one’s individual agency is not involved, 
reflected, nor manifested in one’s agency’s failure.  Such failure does not 
exhibit a responsibility-establishing connection between the individual 
person’s agency and her unwitting conduct.     
 Given the account of responsibility as a relation between agency and 
conduct, it follows that responsibility comes in degrees.  A person as good at 
phi-ing as is humanly possible is an ideal type.  People generally fall 
somewhere between the (inherently imperfect) human ideal and utter 
incompetence.  Accordingly, the extent to which one’s conduct involves – 
engages, expresses, manifests – one’s individual agency can fluctuate.  
Entailing that one may be more or less responsible.  Thus, in the case of 
negligence, responsibility grows the more the failure of one’s agency is due to 
shortcomings in one’s facility – as an individual agent – to live up to one’s 
competency.  In contrast, one’s responsibility for one’s negligence diminishes 
the more it is due to failings in one’s agency as a generic human agent.  It is 
only the ideal type who is not at all responsible for her unwitting failures, as 
her agency (as an individual) is not at all involved in her failure.    
 These insights apply to our example.  Ed and Ned are equal in their human 
imperfection yet differ in their quality as individual agents when it comes to 
doctoring.  This is evidenced in the pair’s very different records of success, 
notwithstanding their similar competencies.  Considering that he comes close 
to being as able at doctoring as any human can be, nearly perfect Ed’s rare 
episodes of negligence involve mostly his imperfections as a human agent and 
far less his shortcomings as an individual agent, of which, in the context of 
doctoring, he has few.  And this is why Ed is not responsible for his malpractice 
or, at least, why he is far less responsible than Ned, whose negligent conduct 
involves, expresses, and manifests much more of his agency as an individual.  
For instance, freed from external pressures, the appropriate response for the 
chief of surgery to Ed’s failure is less to blame him and more to console and 
empathize, telling Ed that everyone makes mistakes and that nobody is perfect, 
not even he.  The fact is that we can only expect so much of people.  A certain 
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measure of accidental error is just part of the human condition.  
 My conclusion from all this is that responsibility for an instance of 
negligent phi-ing turns on the quality of one’s individual agency at meeting 
one’s competency at phi-ing.  Here is why.  As argued above, agency failure 
accounts for how agency can be involved, expressed, and manifested in one’s 
unwitting conduct.  Yet, as we just saw, not all agency failures leading to 
unwitting and improper conduct establish personal responsibility for such 
conduct.  Only those agency failures involving one’s agency as an individual 
establish such responsibility.   Moreover, the measure of involvement of one’s 
agency as an individual in one’s unwitting phi-ing determines the measure of 
one’s responsibility for phi-ing.  Which is why responsibility for an instance 
of unwittingly failing to phi turns on the background quality of one’s agency 
at meeting one’s competency for phi-ing: the better one is at phi-ing at one’s 
competency the less one’s occasional agency failures while phi-ing involve, 
manifest, and reflect one’s individual agency, making one less responsible for 
such failures. 
 What exactly is this “background quality of agency” and how does it relate 
to one’s past record at phi-ing?  Any instance of unwitting failure involves a 
certain competency which one unwittingly fails to meet.  How good one is at 
meeting that competency – that is the quality of one’s agency at doing so – is 
a background fact about one’s agency.  For example, given the quality of his 
agency at doctoring, going into any given operation Ed has a 99.9% chance of 
performing to his competency.  
 Notice that quality of agency is typically diachronic.  Our abilities do not 
just appear and disappear spontaneously.  Rather, they mostly gradually and 
incrementally develop, change, and form over time.13  Thus, although quality 
of agency is forever changing and is therefore always somewhat vague, 
typically it is fairly stable.  Accordingly, how good one is at any given time at 
meeting one’s competency for phi-ing is almost invariably a diachronic matter.  
Sudden or rapid advances and deteriorations in agency quality do occur, such 
as developmental leaps in small children.  And when such rapid changes occur, 
the quality of one’s agency is of course not a matter of gradual development.  
The same is true for temporary agency-defeating events, for instance                                                         
13 On the historicity of agency and responsibility, see Fischer & Ravizza, supra 
note 1 at 194-201; Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other (Harvard 
University Press, 1998) at 278-79; Tadros, supra note 1 at 140-42; Michael 
McKenna, “A Modest Historical Theory of Moral Responsibility” (2016) 20:1 J 
Ethics 83.  
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intoxication, a passing illness, or fatigue, during which the quality of one’s 
agency might dip.  But for the most part, at any given moment the quality of 
one’s agency at meeting one’s competency for phi-ing is more or less the same 
as it was in the relatively recent past and will be in the relatively near future.  
Which is why, although hardly an exact science, the best evidence for what is 
the quality of one’s agency at the time of any given instance of agency failure 
is usually one’s (recent) past record of performing that type of conduct.     
 To conclude, personal responsibility for an instance of negligence is a 
feature of how good one’s agency is at living up to one’s competency for 
performing that type of activity.  The better one is at meeting one’s own 
competency for phi-ing, the more one’s occasional unwitting agency failures 
at phi-ing are due to one’s humanity and less to one’s shortcomings as an 
individual agent, thereby making one less personally responsible.  This is 
because the higher the quality of one’s agency at meeting one’s competency, 
the less one’s agency – as an individual – is involved, expressed, and 
manifested in one’s instances of negligence.  Conversely, the worse one is at 
meeting one’s own competency for phi-ing, the more one’s occasional 
unwitting agency failures at phi-ing are due to one’s shortcomings as an 
individual agent, thereby making one more personally responsible.    
 
10 Elucidations and Responses to Possible Objections 
 
10.1   But Isn’t Our Humanity Part of Us?     
 
And if so, why are we less or even not at all responsible for negligence 
involving our humanity rather than our individual agency?  Well, the view that 
our humanity comes with a measure of built-in responsibility for unintended, 
unwitting and accidental conduct – regardless of the features or the 
involvement of our agency as individuals – is anathema to the idea of personal 
responsibility.  Such a view entails that we are responsible for what our 
individual agency is not engaged, manifested, expressed, or involved in 
bringing about.  It is a view echoing doctrines of original sin.  I cannot believe 
that we are responsible for our unwitting wrongdoings simply by virtue of 
being born human.  Personal responsibility inherently turns on those features 
that make us into individual agents – on our responsibility capacities and on 
how we exercise them – not on the background features of our generic 
humanity.  For me, here we reach bedrock.  Sadly, nowadays society is 
drenched not in compassion but much more in blame-culture.  Yet, as 
unintuitive as it may seem to some, the fact is that Ed is just not responsible.           
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10.2   But Ed’s Conduct Was Improper, Wasn’t It?  
 
Yes, it was.  In fact, it was likely wrongful as it violated the patient’s rights.  
Which is why Ed should not, for example, brush off his patient’s complaints 
by saying “it wasn’t me, it was my humanity.”  But this is not a problem for 
my account of responsibility in negligence.  We are often attached in a morally 
significant way to what our agency is causally wrapped up with, even without 
being responsible for it.  For instance, while Ed probably would as well as 
should feel a measure of remorse for his conduct, he ought not and probably 
would not have similar sentiments towards Ned’s malpractice.  Yet such 
sentiments in relation to what he did are not necessarily an indication of Ed’s 
responsibility for his malpractice.  Rather the phenomenon of “agent regret,” 
to borrow Bernard Williams’ terminology, is the better explanation of the 
appropriateness of such sentiments. 14 Similarly, any anger Ed’s aggrieved 
patient may understandably harbor towards Ed is best explained in terms of 
understandable resentment rather than as reflective of Ed’s responsibility.15  
The realm of moral sentiments is a rich one, explaining our various reasonable 
reactions to improper conduct without necessarily committing to notions of 
original sin.         
 
10.3   Good at Doing What One Is Good at Doing? 
 
But is not the distinction between competency and quality of agency at meeting 
one’s competency artificial?  Are the two not the same thing?  Is being bad at 
meeting one’s competency not the same as being incompetent?  I think not.  
Denying the distinction between an agent’s competency for phi-ing and her 
ability to meet that competency yields a flat account of agency too 
impoverished to explain the phenomenon of negligence.   
 As already explained (Section 7) and what is crucial to understand is that 
the gap between one’s competency and one’s actual performance in meeting 
that competency makes negligence possible.  Were it the case that actual 
performance was the limit of competency, then failing to meet one’s                                                         
14  Bernard Williams, “Moral Luck” in D Statman, ed, Moral Luck (State 
University of New York Press, 1993) 35.   
15  On victim resentment, see David Heyd, “Resentment and Reconciliation: 
Alternative Responses to Historical Evil” in A Gosseries & LH Meyer, eds, 
Justice in Time (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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competency would have been impossible as, for that matter, would have 
exceeding one’s competency.  Not only is this conclusion prima facie 
implausible, but denying the gap between competency and ability to meet it is 
incompatible with the very idea of negligence as well as with the evaluation, 
liability, and sense of ownership and responsibility that typically appropriately 
accompany exceeding or falling below one’s competency.  Moreover, 
accepting that there is such a gap between competency and performance, and 
recognizing that when conduct is characterized as negligent this gap is a 
function of a failure in the agent to live up to her competency, lead to the 
realization that there is a distinction between one’s competency and how good 
one is – the quality of one’s agency – at meeting that competency.  The size of 
the gap can fluctuate, allowing for two people, such as Ed and Ned, of similar 
competency yet different abilities when it comes to meeting that competency.  
 
10.4   Quality of Agency Set at Birth?  
 
But are people not born with an already set quality of agency?  And if so, does 
not the spirit of my overall approach suggest that we are not responsible for 
manifestations of those features of the quality of our agency?  I think not.  First, 
unlike our humanity, quality of individual agency is not entirely set in stone.  
Accordingly, “the original sin problem” does not arise here to the same extent 
as it does in the case of our human fallibility.  Moreover, even if to an extent 
our capability to meet our competency is set at birth – for example perhaps 
some people are just born careless or absent-minded – ascribing responsibility 
to an individual person based on her agency’s innate shortcomings may still in 
some sense involve personal responsibility.  Because responsibility here is 
attributed based on features that make one the individual person one is, rather 
than merely a member of a species. 
 
10.5   A Lottery Paradox?  
 
My argument for reduced responsibility in certain cases of negligence is not 
based on the claim that any particular one instance of negligence was 
unavoidable due to human imperfection and, therefore, one is not responsible 
for it because one could not have done otherwise.  Although I do think that 
there may be something to this line of thought, it nevertheless has an air of 
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paradox in the vicinity of the “Lottery Paradox”16 or the “Preface Paradox.”17  
Here is why.  On the one hand, a measure of negligence in a person’s life does 
appear inevitable.  Yet on the other hand, when looked at separately, all 
particular instances of negligence seem avoidable – recall that negligent 
conduct involves unwittingly failing to do that which one should and could 
have done.  The problem, therefore, is that while both claims seem true, they 
do not cohere.  Hence the air of paradox.   
 In any case, it is important to stress that my argument is based not on the 
unavoidability of any instance of negligence but rather on the varying degree 
of involvement and engagement of individual agency in every instance of 
negligence.   
 
10.6 Derivative-Responsibility (or “Tracing”) is Irrelevant 
 
‘Derivative responsibility’ or ‘tracing’ does not help us with the puzzle at hand.  
What is derivative responsibility?  Well, even if one is not directly responsible 
for phi-ing, one’s responsibility for phi-ing may derive from one’s 
responsibility for psi-ing, specifically where one’s subsequent phi-ing was a 
reasonably foreseeable outcome of one’s psi-ing. 18    This is a familiar 
construction in law.  For example, although when inebriated one may lack 
capacity for responsibility, one’s responsibility for driving under the influence 
derives from one’s responsibility for knowingly having put oneself in a 
position in which it was reasonably foreseeable that one would act 
irresponsibly – that is consciously choosing to get drunk at the pub while 
knowing that once drunk one might then likely endeavor to drive home.19  
Philosophers talk of “tracing” with a similar idea in mind.20 
 Yet the idea of derivative-responsibility does not explain what we set out                                                         
16 On the “lottery paradox”, see Henry Kyburg, Probability and the Logic of 
Rational Belief (Wesleyan University Press, 1961). 
17 On the “preface paradox” see DC Makinson, “The Paradox of the Preface” 
(1965) 25:6 Analysis 205–07.              
18 I say reasonably “foreseeable” because one is obviously not responsible for 
all the outcomes of one’s conduct.  
19 See Dan B Dobbs, The Law of Torts, vol 1 (Westgroup, 2000) at 493-550; 
Restatement (second) Torts § 283 (1965) For a case involving an epileptic 
seizure while driving, see People v Decina, 138 NE (2d) 799 (1956).    
20   See, e.g., John M Fischer & Neal A Tognazzini, “The Truth About Tracing” 
(2009) 43:3 Nous 531; Zimmerman, supra note 6. 
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to examine.  First, some cases of negligence clearly do not involve derivative-
responsibility.  For instance, Ned’s malpractice is a paradigmatic case in which 
we hold people responsible, yet it does not involve derivative-responsibility.  
The error Ned made while operating was not a reasonably foreseeable outcome 
of the treatment.  After all, even if not the best, Ned is a competent surgeon, 
which is why there was nothing wrongful – vis-à-vis his subsequent 
malpractice – in Ned’s decision to perform the operation.  
 Second, derivative-responsibility does not fit our everyday judgments 
regarding responsibility for negligence.  For instance, the disappointment, 
censure, and blame that instances of responsibility for negligence tend to 
attract – both from the culprit as well as from others – are invariably for acting 
negligently, not for foreseeably causing oneself to act negligently.  
 
10.7   Attributionism, Not Volitionism  
 
As briefly explained in Section 3, volitionism is the view that responsibility 
for phi-ing is somehow grounded in one’s willing one’s phi-ing; a paradigm 
of responsibility that fits nicely with our ideas about responsibility for 
intentional conduct.  As explained, the problem is that volitionism does not 
seem able to account for responsibility for unwitting conduct.     
 It is important to note, however, that volitionism is not the only game in 
town. 21  What is labeled “attributionism” is an alternative paradigm of 
responsibility, rejecting volition as a necessary condition for responsibility and 
opening the door for responsibility for unwitting conduct.  Broadly speaking, 
attributionists recognize that when conduct involves certain specified features 
of one’s agency the conduct is attributable to that agent in a way that 
establishes the agent’s responsibility for the conduct, even if the agent did not 
intend or choose to so act.22  Accordingly, while I believe novel and perhaps 
even surprising, my account of responsibility in negligence does fall within an 
established paradigm.                                                          
21 On the distinction between attributionism and volitionism see, e.g., Smith, 
supra note 4. 
22 See, e.g., Scanlon, supra note 13 at 268-69; Angela M Smith, “Responsibility 
for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life” (2005) 115:2 Ethics 236; 
George Sher, “Out of Control” (2006) 116:2 Ethics 285; Tadros, supra note 1; 
Pamela Hieronymi, “Responsibility for Believing” (2008) 161:3 Synthese at 
357; Angela Smith, “Control, Responsibility and Moral Assessment” (2008) 
138:3 Philosophical Studies 367; Smith, ibid. 
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10.8   Isn’t It “The Better You Are the More Responsible You Become”? 
 
Do we not expect more from those who are better at performing a certain task?  
If anything, are they not more responsible for their negligence?  Going back to 
the doctors’ example, let’s imagine a third character called Meg.  Meg’s rate 
of success in the operating room is 90%, which is lower than Ed’s rate of 
99.9%.  On a given day both accidently make the same inadvertent error.  If 
anything, is Ed not more responsible for his negligence than Meg is for hers?  
After all, all things considered, he is the better doctor – do we not hold him to 
a higher standard?  Is not his negligence more the result of his agency as an 
individual than of his human imperfection?    
 Not necessarily.  The example trades on ambiguity.  What is not clear is 
whether the difference between the two doctors’ success rates is a function of 
different degrees of ability – that is whether the difference is a function of 
variations in competency – or is it a function of variations in quality of agency 
at meeting their competency (or some combination of both factors).  My 
contention that responsibility for negligence is predicated on quality of agency 
at meeting one’s competency was fleshed out through exploring an example 
of two doctors (Ned and Ed) of similar competency yet of different caliber of 
agency: one consistently had more episodes of agency failures than the other.  
Setting the two’s competency for the same level helped flesh out – accounting 
for the implications that human fallibility has for personal responsibility – how 
the pair’s degrees of responsibility for their respective negligence were 
sensitive to the quality of their respective agencies.   
 We can reach a similar conclusion about responsibility for negligence by 
looking at a case of two doctors of similar quality of agency yet of different 
competency.  Although of similar quality of agency in meeting their respective 
competencies, such doctors would exhibit a different success rate due to the 
difference in their competencies.  Yet I believe that the level of responsibility 
of each one of these doctors for a given unwitting error is the same.  As 
explained, we should not expect one to outperform one’s competency, which 
is why so long as each doctor is largely living up to their competency they are 
not or at least are less responsible for their rare unwitting failures.  Given that 
some such failure is unavoidable, the two doctors’ responsibility for any given 
failure will increase with their failures becoming more a function of their 
shortcomings as individual agents than of their fallibility as human agents.  
Given that the two doctors exhibit similar levels of care – the quality of each 
one’s agency at meeting his or her individual competency is the same – their 
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responsibility for their failures is also the same, regardless of the fact that one 
doctor errs more often than the other due to the disparity in competency.                            
 The objection under consideration appears to have the most traction in 
cases in which the difference in performance is a function of the two doctors’ 
different degrees of competency where, in addition, the more successful doctor 
demonstrates a lower degree of care, that is, his agency fails more and is less 
able at meeting its own competency.  In such cases we do hold the better doctor 
more responsible for an instance of negligence.   
 But here too, at the end of the day, the objection is unconvincing.  Here is 
why.  Assume Meg’s 90% success rate is a function of her mediocre 
competency but high quality of agency at meeting that competency and that 
Ed’s 99.9% success rate is a function of his extraordinary abilities and 
competency but mediocre agency at meeting that competency.  In such a case 
Ed’s responsibility for his rare unwitting failures is indeed greater than Meg’s 
– as the objection assumes.  Yet the reason for this is Ed’s agency’s lower level 
of care in meeting his very high level of competency.  Thus, even though Ed 
performs better than Meg, Ed’s performance in relation to his competency is 
less impressive than Meg’s performance in relation to her competency.  
Accordingly, even in those cases in which we sense the more responsible party 
is the person with a better overall performance rate, the reason for this is still 
his lower quality of agency at meeting his competency and not his high level 
of competency.  
 
 
